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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between audit committee, political 
influence and financial reporting quality of Malaysian listed companies. 
This study consists of pool data of 3,215 firm-year observations listed on 
the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from year 2010 to 2014. The study uses 
logistic regression to test the association between audit committee, political 
influence and financial reporting quality. The results are also robust with 
the inclusion of Firth logit analysis. The current findings indicate that 
audit committee’s independence and the frequency of audit committee 
meetings are effective in controlling for both real earnings management 
and accounting misstatements. Nonetheless, in terms of audit committee size 
and audit committee’ audit expertise, the relationships are still insignificant. 
It is important to note that there is some improvement after the corporate 
governance reforms in 2010 since studies prior to the reforms found audit 
committee’s variables are ineffective towards a higher quality of financial 
reporting. Meanwhile, political influence is still relevant in a Malaysian 
business environment with regard to financial reporting quality, however, the 
aggressiveness of the influence may have been diluted by the improvement 
of recent corporate governance reform. 
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INTRODUCTION
The erosion of financial reporting quality is often associated with significant 
accounting irregularities and manipulations such as earnings management, 
accounting misstatements, and fraudulent financial reporting (Boon, Tze 
& Lau 2017; Abdul Rahman, et al., 2016). These financial accounting 
irregularities are perceived to be related to managerial opportunism. 
Earnings management occurs when financial figures are manipulated 
within the accounting framework – Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and is often described as the practice of “bending the 
rules”. Compliance with the GAAP is a criterion for differentiating types of 
accounting irregularities (Stolowy & Breton, 2003). However, when figures 
are severely manipulated by which rules have been broken, the GAAP 
are violated. The violation of GAAP may constitute both unintentional 
(accounting errors) and intentional (fraud) misstatement (Dechow, Ge & 
Schrand, 2010). 
Earnings management occurs when the management has the discretion 
to exploit the accounting choices that would alter the reported earnings 
and falsify the true economic performance of the firm with the intention to 
deceive the stakeholders. Meanwhile, accounting misstatements are initially 
an earnings management, which often happens when the firm underperforms, 
this cover-up would eventually go down a “slippery slope,” resulting in 
layers of accounting manipulation leading to accounting misstatement. 
Accounting misstatement would have resulted in a financial restatement, 
which is the correction of any non-compliance with the GAAP in terms 
of recognition, measurement and disclosure in the financial statement that 
have been issued previously (European Commission, 2009: 2011; Abdullah 
et al., 2010; Efendi et al., 2007; Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz, 2004).
The consequences for the accounting misstatement would have caused 
a series of severe penalties for the individual firms, particularly when the 
restatement embroils in an income-decreasing manipulation scheme and past 
performance of those firms are relatively far worse off (Rotenstein, 2011). 
The disclosure of accounting misstatements or restatements would usually 
be followed by a rapid decline of the firms’ market value (Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney, 1996). They argued that since investors perceived the firms 
have been overvalued, thus the announcement of restatement will help to 
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adjust the firm’s share price accordingly (Dechow et al., 1996). Furthermore, 
stakeholders such as the investors and the regulatory bodies may even pursue 
with the necessary legal action (Rotenstein, 2011; Zhizhong et al., 2011; 
Cornil, 2009; GAO, 2006; Palmrose et al., 2004).
To date, accounting misstatement is still an issue that is ignored and 
disregarded both by the firms and the public in Malaysia. Suspected firms 
are only required to issue a restatement of the financial statements (especially 
when the misstatements have been proven as not fraudulent). Meanwhile, 
individual wrongdoers (directors, managers, and other employees of the firm) 
would be prosecuted separately, mostly receiving inadequate punishment 
or penalties.  Perols and Lougee (2011) suggested that firms with a history 
of managing earnings are more predisposed to commit fraud. Prior studies 
have shown that managers use their discretion to manipulate accounting 
numbers for both opportunistic and informative purposes. Merely adopting 
several rigorous and detailed framework of international accounting and 
auditing standards does not prove the assurance that financial reporting is 
free from errors, mistakes and manipulation (Pornupatham, 2006). As such, 
the issue of financial misreporting has attracted the attention of regulators, 
academics and collectively the informed investors.
The prospective view that corporate governance would enhance the 
efficiency of contracts and mitigate opportunistic accounting method choice 
has driven strings of accounting research in the corporate governance 
literature. However, existing literature have yet to consider the impression 
of political influence over the corporate governance framework, and 
financial reporting quality (proxy by earnings management and accounting 
misstatement) and its implications in a single study. Therefore, the objective 
of the study is to examine the relationship of audit committee traits (such 
as size, independence, frequency of meetings and audit expertise), political 
influence and financial reporting quality. Specifically, this study highlights 
the efficiency of audit committee of Malaysian firms in preventing possible 
opportunistic behaviour while improving the appropriate accounting choices 
and oversees the financial reporting quality.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Conflict of interest, temptations, self-validation and opportunity induce 
managerial opportunism. Ambiguities of accounting standards and 
framework as well as real-time operational manipulations offer greater 
managerial discretions (A. Rahman, et al., 2016; Tsitinidis & Duru, 2013) 
and would encourage managerial opportunism. Managerial opportunism 
ensues due to the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders 
where managers would preside the wealth transfer to themselves as the 
opportunity arise. Consistent with the agency theory, managers would 
have the advantage of having inside information thus creating information 
asymmetry with the shareholders. Thus, creating opportunities for the 
managers to take advantage over the information asymmetry, engaging 
in self-interest activities which would be detrimental to the shareholders’ 
interest (Godfrey, Hodgson & Holmes, 2003). Among the moral hazard 
problems that are prevalent in the principal-agent relationship is the 
deception and misappropriation of fund. Inevitably, earnings being among 
the measure of operational performance of a company is subjected to the 
threat managers’ moral hazard problem which would result in financial 
misreporting.
With different focus, the alignment of interests of both managers and 
shareholders is difficult without any intervention. Therefore, corporate 
governance mechanisms are established as the binding ingredient, while 
a Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) were established 
to encourage consistency in financial reporting and to ensure financial 
statements are reliable, relevant, and truthful. Although numerous 
endeavours have been put in place to assist and oversee the financial 
reporting process, the financial reporting quality is yet to be free of financial 
misreporting. The collapsed of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI), Barings Bank, Global Crossing, Tyco, 
Parmalat, Royal Ahold and Socite General, and Toshiba are a few examples 
of severe corporate failures that have shattered the credibility and integrity 
of the financial reporting due to bad accounting scandals. Consequently, the 
merit of accounting practices and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
are in questions due to these accounting “cover-ups” (Abdullah et al. 2010). 
Although majority of the massive corporate failures taking the spotlight do 
not include those of Malaysian corporations, the pandemic lingers around.
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Theoretically, financial information would aid and assist stakeholders 
to make informed decision making; while distinguishing between 
performing and non-performing firms. Although the standard setters such as 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) have provided detailed accounting standards and 
framework, there are still rooms for managerial discretions. Managerial 
discretions serve to provide additional and meaningful information (Perotti 
& Windisch, 2017; Hazarika, Karpoff & Nahata, 2012), however, managerial 
discretions may also lead to earnings manipulation. According to Ghazali, 
Shafie and Mohd Sanusi (2015), managers may manipulate the ambiguity in 
the accounting standards to manage earnings in fulfilling their self-interest 
motivation.
Existing literature has yet to offer an exclusive and conclusive 
definition for the term earnings management. Schipper (1989) defines 
earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. On a 
similar note, Mulford and Comiskey (1996) also asserted that “earnings 
management is the active manipulation of accounting results for the 
purpose of creating an altered impression of business performance”. 
Similarly,  Healy and Wahlan (1999) also described earnings management 
as “the management’s judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
Although the definitions of earnings management vary within the literature, 
one element was clearly evident – the management has the control over 
the financial reporting process and is likely to abuse that power if the need 
arises to protect their own interest.
Prior literature established two prevalent sides of earnings management, 
namely, informational view and opportunistic position (Tsitinidis & Duru, 
2013; Jiraporn et al., 2008). From the standpoint of opportunistic purpose, 
earnings management is commonly referred to as a harmful accounting 
manipulation to achieve desired targets. Meanwhile, the informational 
perspective defines earnings management as a channel to foretell and portend 
financial information that would improve the outlook of firm performance 
(Tsitinidis & Duru, 2013; Jiraporn, et al., 2008). Informative earnings 
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management would reduce volatility and improve the firm’s earnings 
persistence (Stein & Wang, 2016; Dai, Kong & Wang, 2013). From the 
informational point of view earnings management is not used for personal 
benefit, rather serves as a communication channel for the management to 
disclose and widen the information content regarding future performance 
leading to informativeness of reported earnings.
However, due to the rise of corporate failures in recent years, 
earnings management has been seen as the malefactor at origin which 
escalates to fraud. Its side effects include tarnished reputation, erosion of 
market confidence, and significantly undermines the credibility, quality, 
transparency and the integrity of the financial reporting. The undesirable 
side effects of earnings manipulation have brought about the debate 
regarding the legality of earnings management practice. In both theory and 
practical, earnings management includes a wide variety of legal and illegal 
activities of managerial discretions. It has also been suggested that earnings 
management is a fraction of financial fraud (Kedia, Koh & Rajgopal, 2015). 
Respectively, Md Nasir et al. (2018) and Heinz, Patel and Hellman (2014) 
also argued that earnings management is a non-neutral accounting process 
thus it is illegal and unethical.
More recently, the issue of accounting misstatement as red flags of 
fraudulent financial reporting has taken the limelight of accounting research 
(e.g. Bishop, DeZoort and Hermanson, 2017; Ilter, 2014; Dechow et al., 
2011; Firth et al., 2011). Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance, political influence, earnings 
management, and accounting misstatement. In the context of the current 
study, accounting misstatement represents material accounting misstatement 
that is restated in succeeding year. Figure 1 identifies the phases of earnings 
management and accounting misstatements.
Prior cases of Malaysian corporate scandals’ rulings (refer to Appendix 
A) exhibit a poor enforcement of regulations and unduly leniency of the 
judiciary system with regards to financial misreporting. The individual 
wrongdoers were not being adequately penalized for their wrongdoings. 
Furthermore, if the regulators are unable to provide evidence of fraud from 
the material misstatements, the implicated firms would only be required 
to restate their financial reports. A plethora of studies suggests that the 
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announcement of accounting misstatement might adversely affect the 
firm’s market valuation, especially when it involves income-decreasing 
earnings management (Hasnan, & Hussain 2015; Dechow et al., 2011; 
Rotenstein, 2011). Nonetheless, accounting misstatement or restatement 
does not affect the firm’s operation nor listing status (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Rotenstein, 2011).
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literature (Duh, 2017; Efendi et al., 2007; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; 
Farber, 2005; and Abbot et al., 2004) have implied that misreporting 
firms are lacking in good corporate governance structure, there is yet 
evidence whether any changes or advancements in corporate governance 
framework improve the detection and correction of misreporting. It would 
be devastating to have the governance structure that looks good on paper 
but are less effective in its implementation.
With regards to firms’ sustenance, political influence is often associated 
with power concentration, incompetency, weak corporate governance, and 
poor performance. It is also commonly perceived that directors with political 
connection enable its firm to receive preferential treatment such as gain 
access to assistance, resources and contracts from the government (Braam, 
et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010). Thus, this kind of situation provides less 
motivation for the firm to produce a high-quality financial reporting (Ball 
et al., 2003).  According to Chaney et al. (2011) and Houston et al. (2014), 
political influence adversely affects the quality of financial reporting. Chen 
et al. (2010) further argue that political influence hampers earnings forecast 
and are more severe in a corrupt environment. 
Unfortunately, political connection may also induce double agency 
problems comprising self-interested behaviour of both the managers and 
the politician (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) jeopardizing firms’ accounting 
system (Tagesson, 2007). In particular, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) proposed 
a model depicting the relationship between politicians and managers. 
They suggested that politician on the Board may persuade the managers in 
pursuing their political objectives using their connection and power, and (ii) 
managers may reverse the situation if the control rights of the firms are held 
by the politicians. Political influence may also divert the firms’ objectives 
of maximizing shareholders’ wealth to political objectives (Boubakri et 
al., 2013).
Liew (2007) argued that current corporate governance reforms are 
inadequate to efficiently distinguish and come up with the solutions for 
the underlying political issues in Malaysia. Among the major cause for 
this is the effect of crony capitalism (Kang, 2003). Empirical studies on 
crony capitalism suggest that dominant political leaders use their power for 
their own advantage (White, 2004). Prior studies on political connection 
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provide evidence that politically-connected firms received preferential 
treatment from their political ties and networks (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). In the recent Economist’s crony-capitalism 
index 2014, Malaysia ranked third globally after Hong Kong and Russia. 
An example of incidents regarding cronyism can be observed from 
the findings of Alfan (2010), which focused on the accountability of Tolled 
highway projects in Malaysia. Her findings provide evidence of government 
intervention through GLCs (a direct result of the Bumiputera policy). 
The study also found that the government are more biased towards GLCs 
as compared to its counterpart (Alfan, 2010). Meanwhile, Yusoff (2010) 
focused on the attributes and characteristics of the board of directors of 
Malaysian PLCs. Her findings show that the majority of board members 
in GLCs are Bumiputera and most the Bumiputera directors are retired 
high ranking government officials. Yusoff (2010) also found that corporate 
governance among the GLCs is less superior as compared to non-GLCs.
Firms with political connection are more inclined not to manage 
earnings in keeping the connection discreet from public knowledge. Hence, 
the motivation for firms with political connection to manage earnings are 
different from its counterpart and may involve other motives other than 
meeting target earnings (Braam et al., 2015).  Existing literature suggested 
that firms with political connections are more susceptible to political 
pressure affecting the earnings management practices (Li et al., 2016; 
Chaney et al., 2011; Ramanna & Roychowdhury, 2010; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004). It is argued that firms with political connection are less concern to 
maintain credible quality of financial reporting thus these firms are more 
susceptible to various incidents of financial misreporting such as earnings 
management which would result to accounting misstatement. Moreover, due 
to government intervention and close connection with high ranking profiles, 
if detected those firms with political connections who manages earnings 
are less susceptible towards being punished by accounting restatement.
Since accounting misstatement represents a significant financial 
reporting failure, understanding the contributing factors would be favourable 
for both the regulators and the public as a whole. The weaknesses of 
corporate governance mechanisms and political influence are suggested as 
two primary factors driving an occurrence of accounting misstatements and 
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these factors are supported by previous empirical evidence (Abdul Wahab 
et al., 2014; Wuttichindanon, 2012). Even though, there has been some 
pioneering research which has focused on the determinants of accounting 
misstatement, most of the existing findings were derived from samples in 
developed economies such as the U.K. and the U.S. An interesting question 
is whether the findings of existing literature will generalise to developing 
economy such as Malaysia which is characterized by with high political 
influence.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
Agency Theory
Fundamentally, agency theory advocates that the principals and the 
agents have an imperfect relationship, and there would be frictions and 
conflict of interest. The theory is illustrated that when corporate management 
is independent from the influence of corporate ownership, the manager 
would swerve from only maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The segregation 
of function creates a situation where managers would have the advantage 
in terms of inside information. Information asymmetry would spark agency 
conflicts between both the shareholders and managers.
Agency conflict also known as the agency problems occur when 
there is a divergence of interest between the principal and the agent. The 
situation would prompt the agent to not act in the best interest of the principal 
(Mallin, 2007). Opportunistic behaviour pursuing personal objectives and 
covets provides a strong motivation for the agent to make decisions that 
would maximize their self-interest rather than pursuing the principal’s goals 
(Ghazali et al., 2015). Generally, the objectives behind the motivations, 
among others are, to report reasonable profit or avoid losses, to obtain bank 
loans and avoid debt covenant violation, to increase share prices, and to 
avoid regulatory actions. Meanwhile, the loopholes in the accounting system 
extended a greater possibility for opportunistic behaviour by manipulating 
and exploiting the GAAP resulting in earnings management.
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Stewardship Theory
One of the important theoretical developments in sociological and 
management literature that would explain the assessment of the audit 
committee’s effectiveness is the stewardship theory. Stewardship theory 
extends the agency theory literature in explaining the management behaviour 
but in a different direction. The theory assumes that people in general, are 
morally good and selfless, as long as a number of organizational and cultural 
preconditions are satisfied. Stewardship theory excludes the agency theory’s 
depiction of a person to be individualistic, materialistic, and opportunistic, 
forcing both proactive “alignment of interests” and rigid monitoring. Instead, 
proponents of stewardship theory argue that the steward would always carry 
out their responsibilities diligently, maximizing financial performance and 
shareholder wealth.
Indirectly, the relationship between shareholders and directors 
(audit committee members) can also be observed as being the relationship 
between the principal and the steward; since shareholders employ those 
who have proven themselves to be independent, trustworthy and driven for 
accomplishment as the directors of the firm. Stewardship theory recognizes 
empowerment, participation and motivation in organizational behaviour. 
Effective stewardship focuses on the need for achievement and recognition, 
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority 
and the work ethic. Thus, grounded in the stewardship theory, it is assumed 
that the directors would be more motivated to incorporate and seek to 
attain the firm’s objectives rather than fulfilling their personal interest. The 
operationalization of the stewardship theory is due to the combination of 
firm context and the psychological attributes of the directors being members 
of the audit committee (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997).
As the agency theory stresses more on the control and monitoring 
role of the audit committee, the stewardship theory puts more emphasis 
on the board’s role in the strategic formulation (Lawal, 2012).  According 
to stewardship theory, executive directors are deemed more effective as 
they are more familiar with the business operations; they also have the 
required knowledge, expertise and experience; and more importantly the 
insider knowledge to carry out their responsibility as compared to outside 
directors (Nicholson & Kiel 2007; Stiles, 2001; Donaldson and Muth, 1998; 
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Helmer, 1996). Additionally, the idea of Stewardship theory also suggests 
that firms would benefit more if they have a smaller board size. Donaldson 
and Muth (1998), suggested that a smaller board size would promote better 
cohesiveness and bonding among the directors.  The delegation of power 
and responsibilities of executive directors would also facilitate effective 
monitoring and control (Lawal, 2012). Nevertheless, the stewardship theory 
is still in its emergent phase and would require further validation (Davis et 
al., 1997). Based on the insights of agency theory and stewardship theory, 
the following conceptual framework as shown in Figure 2 is proposed for 
this study.
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earnings management, this would trigger a setback on the functionality of 
corporate governance. Although there are several studies investigating on the 
associations of accrual earnings management with accounting misstatements 
(Dechow et al., 2011), and with fraudulent financial reporting (Hasnan et 
al., 2017), the association of real earnings management and accounting 
misstatement is yet to be explored and determined. Furthermore, there are 
no statistics for financial misreporting of firms in the Malaysian corporate 
setting except for fraud firms. 
The operationalization of the efficiency of audit committee is further 
explained below.
The Effect of Audit Committee Size on Earnings Management 
and Accounting Misstatement
Following the eruption of major corporate scandals, the NYSE 
and NASDAQ’s have mandated that listed firms are required to have a 
minimum of three independent directors on the audit committee (Klein, 
2002). Likewise, Malaysian listed firms have also been imposed of a similar 
requirement, however, only with regard to the size of the audit committee 
(MCCG, 2000). The MCCG also requires the composition of audit committee 
members to be non-executive directors without limiting the composition 
to include only independent directors. However, the MCCG’s requirement 
for listed firms is not compulsory unless the requirement has also been 
sanctioned by other regulatory bodies. Since the Bursa Malaysia’s Listing 
Requirement is silent with regards to the audit committee’s composition, 
listed firms may not be in full compliance with the MCCG recommendation 
with regard to audit committee’s composition. 
Several studies found that audit committee size is irrelevant towards 
limiting the occurrences of earnings management and accounting 
manipulation (Mohd Saleh et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2005; Xie et al., 
2003). However, audit committees have been widely recommended as an 
important means of improving the quality of corporate financial reporting 
practices (MCCG, 2012; Ramsay, 2001), thus the audit committee size 
would be deemed to one of the contributing factors. Choi, Jeon and Park 
(2004) suggested that the size of the audit committee is imperative; having 
more members would bring in varied expertise enabling the committee to 
scrutinize and monitor financial reporting practices intensively.
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It has been suggested that at least three members “… provides the 
necessary strength and diversity of expertise and views to ensure appropriate 
monitoring” (Bedard et al., 2004, p. 18). Nevertheless, Baxter (2007) 
posits that the size of audit committee would be less likely to have a linear 
relationship. Contradictly, Karamanou & Vafeas (2005, p. 458) asserted that 
“larger audit committees have a wider knowledge base on which to draw 
but are likely to suffer from process losses and diffusion of responsibility.” 
The Effect of Audit Committee Independence on Earnings 
Management and Accounting Misstatement
Audit committee independence has often been regarded as imperative 
toward the efficiency of the committee in its role of overseeing the financial 
reporting activities. Although the UK and the US regulated that the members 
of the audit committee are to consist of independent directors, developing 
countries such Malaysia, Singapore and China set the requirement that only 
the majority of audit committee members should be independent directors. 
Initially, MCCG (2000) sets out that audit committee members should 
consist of a majority of independent directors, however, after the revision 
in 2007, it is recommended that all the audit committee members consist 
of only non-executive directors. 
Several studies have investigated whether the independence of audit 
committee influences the quality of financial reporting. Some studies 
found a negative link between greater audit committee independence and 
earnings management, suggesting that monitoring function is effective 
(Mohd Saleh et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2005; Klein, 2002). Meanwhile, 
Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali (2008) did not find conclusive empirical 
evidence in ruling the relationship between audit committee independence 
and earnings management. 
The Effect of Audit Committee Meeting on Earnings 
Management and Accounting Misstatement
Merely having an audit committee without any activity would not 
produce any outcome (Menon and Williams, 1994). To be effective, the 
audit committee should make efforts in performing their obligations and 
delivering the desired outcome. Thus, the audit committee meeting can be 
regarded as an attempt to make that effort. MCCG (2000) requires that the 
audit committee should have a private meeting (without the presence of 
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executive directors) at least once a year. In the revised MCCG 2007, it has 
been highly recommended for the audit committee members have a private 
meeting (without the presence of executive directors) the external auditors at 
least twice a year. Additionally, the Bursa Malaysia Corporate Governance 
Guide (2009) emphasizes that at a minimum, the audit committee should 
meet at least four times a year (Para 2.6.2).
Baxter (2007) proposes that having a more frequent audit committee 
meeting would enable the committee members to convene and evaluates 
matters regarding financial reporting practices thoroughly. Xie et al., (2003) 
have established that both board of director and audit committee activities 
corresponds negatively towards earnings management. They suggested 
that having more boardroom’s activities (meetings) would increase work 
commitment and reduce bad decision making. Likewise, Choi, Jeon and 
Park (2004, p. 41) indicate that “… actively functioning audit committee 
is more likely to detect earnings management than a dormant committee.” 
Even so, the frequency of boardroom activities does not signify 
the extent of work being accomplished (Menon and Williams (1994). 
Nonetheless, Menon and William (1994) also specify that the frequency 
of boardroom activities would be a good indicator of audit committee 
efficiency. On the other hand, both studies by Bedard et al. (2004) and Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) found that the relationship between the 
frequency of audit committee meetings and the occurrences of earnings 
management is insignificant. 
The Effect of Audit Committee’s Audit Expertise on Earnings 
Management and Accounting Misstatement
The inclusion of directors with financial and accounting background 
on the audit committee is essential as their main responsibility is reviewing 
the financial reporting aspect of the firm such as the adoption of accounting 
policies, compliance with accounting standards, and the going concern 
assumption. Based on this premise, it has been regulated by the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement that at least one of the audit committee 
members should be acquainted with sufficient knowledge of accounting, 
business and finance. Meanwhile, MCCG stipulates that the audit committee 
members are financially literate and are able to comprehend the financial 
reporting matters. Furthermore, the MCCG also recommend that at a 
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minimum there should be at least one member of the audit committee 
member being attached to any accounting association or professional body. 
These requirements are deemed necessary in enabling the audit committee 
to function effectively in keeping tabs with matters of financial reporting 
integrity and internal control efficiency.
Previous studies, such as Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. 
(2004) indicates that having financial expertise on the audit committee 
could do better in relation to financial reporting quality. Both studies 
exhibit a significant, but a negative relationship between the occurrences 
of accounting misstatement and earnings management respectively. On the 
other hand, Xie et al. (2003) have identified that audit committee members 
from an investment banking background are more effective as compared to 
members from legal and commercial banking backgrounds. Using Malaysian 
firms as their study sample, Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) found that having 
more audit committee members with financial and accounting background 
do not lower the incidents of earnings management. Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2008) also arrived at the conclusion that the relationship 
between the audit committee’s proficiency and earnings management 
are inconsequential. Therefore, the current study investigated a specific 
trait of accounting knowledge which is the auditing skills among the 
audit committee members. Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses 
developed.
Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses
H1 There is a significant and negative relationship between audit committee 
and real earnings management among Malaysian listed firms. 
H2 There is a significant and negative the efficiency of audit committee and 
accounting misstatement among Malaysian listed firms.
H3 There is a significant and positive relationship between political influence 
on audit committee and accounting misstatement among Malaysian listed 
firms
H4 There is a significant and negative relationship between political influence 
on audit committee and earnings management (accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management) among Malaysian listed 
firms.
H5 Earnings management (accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management) is less influential towards accounting misstatement in the 
presence of corporate governance and political influence. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Since financial misreporting is a subset of fraudulent financial reporting 
involving ethical issue, observing the occurrence of financial misreporting 
via the secondary data (i.e. financial reports, annual reports and other 
publicly available information) is preferred since it is more practical and do 
not impose biases. Grounded on the positivist paradigm, this study applies 
a deductive approach and quantitative strategy.
Research Sample
The population of interest in this study is comprised of all Malaysian 
firms which are listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia for the year 
2010 continuously listed until 2014. Data from the year 2007 and 2009 are 
not chosen as it was the period of the global financial crisis thus reducing 
biasness and data abnormality. According to Copeland (1968) time horizon 
of four-to-six-year period is adequate to reduce classification errors, 
therefore the sample selection from 2010 to 2014 should be sufficient for 
the study. Table 2 presents the listing statistics on Bursa Malaysia’s Main 
Board from 2010 until 2014. The companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are 
classified into 14 types of industry based on the nature of their business, 
such as Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Construction, Plantation, 
Property, Technology and Trading and Services.
Table 2: Listing Statistics on Bursa Malaysia’s 
Main Board from 2010 until 2014
Year No. of PLCs on Main Board
2014 812
2013 802
2012 809
2011 822
2010 844
To arrive at the total eligible population, the following types of firms 
are excluded from the population being considered for the study:
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1. Initial Public Offerings Firms
 All initial public offerings firms from 2010 to 2014 are excluded from 
the sample because they do not provide data for the five years under 
study.
2. Financial corporations
 All companies that are classified under the financial sector, trusts 
and closed-end funds will not be included due to their incomparable 
features such as differences in compliance and regulatory environment 
(Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et 
al., 2003).
3. Delisted Companies and Incomplete data
 Those companies being delisted during the study period as well as 
those with incomplete financial data or incomplete information on 
corporate governance data are also excluded from this study.
Table 3 presents the selection process, starting with all companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2014. Out of 812, 53 are excluded because 
they are classified under finance companies, trusts and closed-end funds; 
while another 91 companies which were delisted or with incomplete data 
are also excluded. 
Table 3: Selection Criteria for Research Sample
Selection Criteria Number of Companies
Listed Companies on Bursa Malaysia in the year 2014 812
Less: Initial Public Offerings Companies 17
Less: Financial institutions/ Companies 53
Less: Companies with incomplete data 91
Research Sample 651
Less: Extreme Outliers 8
Final Research Sample 643
Data Measurement Models
The main objective of study one is to determine the extent of corporate 
governance’s effectiveness in suppressing financial reporting quality among 
Malaysian listed companies and the extent of the political influence over 
the corporate governance mechanisms. This study employs real earnings 
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management and accounting misstatements to represent (proxy for) 
the financial reporting quality.  The following section explains the data 
measurements and models for both dependent variables and independent 
variables for both studies.
Dependent Variable 1: Accounting Misstatement 
Following prior studies (Wuttichindanon, 2012; Abdullah et al., 2010), 
accounting misstatement is measured by the announcement of financial 
restatement in the succeeding annual report (t+1).  A dummy variable of 
“1” and “0” was assigned for firms with financial restatement and firms 
with no financial restatement, respectively. The announcement of financial 
restatement was looked up in each of the annual reports, searched using 
keywords of “restate”, “restatement”, “restated”, “prior year adjustments” 
or “comparative figure”.
Dependent Variable 2: Real Earnings Management 
Based on prior research (Zang, 2012; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdury, 
2006), real earnings management activities are captured by three models, 
namely the abnormal level of cash flow from operations (CFO), abnormal 
level of discretionary expenses (DISXEP), and abnormal level of production 
costs (PROD). In order to compute the abnormal levels of all the three 
models, the first step is to determine the normal levels of each model. 
Normal levels of cash flow from operations (CFO) are expressed as 
a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period. The 
cross-sectional regression for estimating the normal levels of CFO for every 
industry and year is shown in equation 4.1 below:
Equation 4.1: Normal levels of CFO
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ΔSt  = Change in sales of current year
For every firm-year, the abnormal levels of CFO are computed as the 
differences between the normal level of CFO and the actual figures of CFO 
reported in the financial statements.  
Meanwhile, the regression for the normal level of DISEXP is estimated 
using the equation 4.2 below:
Equation 4.2: Normal levels of DISEXP
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This particular model was developed under the assumptions that 
discretionary expenditures are a linear function of sales (Roychowdury, 
2006). Similarly, for every firm-year, abnormal DISEXP is the difference 
between the expected level of discretionary expenses and the actual 
discretionary expenses. Actual discretionary expenses comprise of both 
the selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses; and research and 
development (R&D) expenses. Apparently, not every firm would have R&D 
expenses, thus the figures for R&D expenses can be set to zero provided 
that the figures for SGA expenses are present.  
The third model, production costs consist of both cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and change in inventory. The normal level of production costs is 
estimated based on the following regression of equation 4.3:
Equation 4.3: Normal levels of PROD
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consist of; audit committee size (ACS), audit committee meeting (ACM), 
audit committee independence (ACI), the audit committee’s audit expertise 
(ACA). Audit committee size (ACS) is measured by the proportion of audit 
committee member to the size of the board of directors.  Audit committee 
meeting (ACM) is measured by the number of meetings held in the financial 
year. Audit committee independence (ACI) is measured by the proportion 
of independent members in the audit committee. Audit committee’s audit 
expertise (ACA) measured by the proportion of members with financial 
and auditing background. Specifically, the expertise of individual audit 
committee members was measured by professional accounting qualifications 
and experience or background in financial auditing. The logic behind this 
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a member of parliament, a minister, a head of state or a state assemblyman 
(Chaney et al., 2011) or a person who is either currently or was formerly 
a government bureaucrat (Fan et al., 2007; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). 
Following Fan et al. (2007), data about politically connected directors were 
obtained by reviewing the profiles of the relevant directors in the company 
annual report, based on the definition mentioned before. In addition, the 
list of cabinet members and parliamentarians and state legislators were 
also reviewed (www.pilihanraya.com.my/melayu/parliamentlist.asp). This 
measure captures the changes of political influence in firms over time. 
In the context of Malaysian business and political environment, it is 
important to include the indirect measure of political influence, by including 
the percentage of Bumiputera-Malay director, hereafter Bumiputera 
director (PMD) as the second measurement. PMD is the proportion of elite 
Bumiputera directors to a total number of directors. Following the approach 
in Yatim et al. (2006), the directors’ ethnicity is determined by examining 
their names. If a director’s name is either Muslim or Malay, it is assumed 
that he/she is a Bumiputera-Malay. However, if the director has a typical 
Chinese name, such as Wong, Tan, Chan or Lee, it is assumed the director 
is Chinese. The elite status of Bumiputera directors is then determined by 
their family and financial background. 
The third measure is the percentage of government ownership (PGV). 
Prior studies on financial reporting quality that utilize similar variables are 
Chen et al. (2010) and Bushman and Piotroski (2006). This information was 
obtained from the annual reports. It is a requirement for all listed firms to 
disclose substantial shareholders in the annual reports, in compliance with 
the Companies Act 1965. Government ownership is determined, based on 
the percentage of shares held in the shareholder listing of the 30 largest 
shareholders with government backgrounds. These shareholders are either 
government agencies or trusts. Government ownership is represented by 
the percentage of shares held by government institutions and agencies 
which are, Khazanah Nasional Berhad (the investment arm of the Ministry 
of Finance), Employees Provident Funds (EPF), pilgrimage board funds 
(Lembaga Tabung Haji), the military pension funds (Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (manages various national 
unit trusts), State Economic Corporation Development (SEDC), Ministry 
of Finance Incorporated, Felda, Felcra, Social Security Organisation 
(Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial).
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Control Variables 
Consistency in findings of prior studies supports the evidence that 
certain firm-specific characteristics influence financial reporting quality. This 
study uses these firm specific characteristics as control variables in order 
to assess the relationship and the impact between corporate governance, 
political influence and financial reporting quality. Control variables chosen 
were firm size, profitability, firm leverage and related party transaction.
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Statistical validity is undertaken to ensure that data analyses and research 
findings are impartial and that the interpretations and conclusions of the 
study are empirically reliable. Normality, autocorrelation, multicollinearity 
and homoscedasticity issues have been taken into consideration and tested. 
The current study used STATA statistical software to perform the required 
statistical analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics
Initially, there was 3255 firm-year observation which includes 39 
accounting misstatement cases from the year 2010 to 2014. However, due to 
extreme outliers eight firms were excluded from the sample, making the final 
sample to consists of 3215 firm-year observation. Apparently, there seems to 
be areas or items of preference in the financial information that is prone to be 
manipulated.  The most common items that are easily exposed to accounting 
manipulation are revenues, accounts receivable and inventory (Dalnial, et al., 
2014; Dechow et al., 2011). The interrelationship between these items and its 
discretion of judgment further subsidize the motivation for manipulation. For 
example, accounts receivable and inventory are directly related to revenue 
recognition and cost of goods sold, and both items eventually affect gross 
profit and net income. Due to these complex interrelationship between the 
items and managerial discretion, the management may take advantage of 
the situation, using it as the avenue for manipulation.   
Table 4 below presents the breakdown of 39 restatement firms which 
have been categorized according to the GAO’s descriptions for accounting 
restatement. Hee (2011) and Palmrose et al. (2004)affecting more accounts, 
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decreasing reported income and attributed to auditors or management (but 
not the Securities and Exchange Commission have identified restatements 
such revenue recognition, reclassification and disclosure, core expenses 
restatement, restatements due to underlying events, restatements due to non-
core expenses and restatements due to other reasons as “core restatement”. 
Based on Table 4, 38.46% of the misstatements were due to revenue 
recognition; 17.95% were due from reclassification and disclosure; 15.38% 
were due to misstated core expenses and underlying events respectively; 
meanwhile, misstatements which were due from non-core expenses is 7.69% 
and misstatements due to other reasons are 5.13%.  The statistics show that 
among the reasons for accounting misstatements of Malaysian listed firms 
involves revenue recognition, reclassification and disclosure, core expenses 
and underlying events. On a similar note, Dechow et al. (2011), suggests 
that these items on the financial statements have a higher probability to be 
manipulated as it would directly affect the firm’s key performance metric, 
which is the gross profit. 
Table 4: The Categorization of 39 Restatement Firms (2010-2014) 
According to GAO’s Descriptions on Accounting Restatement
Category Restatement Firms Percentage
Revenue Recognition 15 38.46
Core Expenses 6 15.38
Non-core Expenses 3 7.69
Reclassification and Disclosure 7 17.95
Underlying Events 6 15.38
Others 2 5.13
Total 39 100
The difference and similarities of corporate governance structure 
of both misstated firms and non-misstated firms are presented in Table 
5. In terms of diversification in the Boardroom, both groups do not show 
significant differences, the characteristics are almost similar. However, 
some of the recommendations of MCCG are more likely to be adopted by 
the misstated firms as compared to non-misstated firms. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics Comparing 
Misstated Firms and Non-Misstated Firms 
Panel A: Continuous Variables (N: 39 misstatements and 3176 
non-misstatement observation)
Continuous Variables Minimum Statistics
Maximum 
Statistics
Mean 
Statistics
Std. Deviation 
Statistics  
ACS
Misstated firms 23 75 47.61 11.256
Non-misstated firms 2 100 46.12 11.986
ACI
Misstated firms 67 100 93.08 13.026
Non-misstated firms 33 100 89.54 15.032
ACM
Misstated firms 4 10 5.28 1.432
Non-misstated firms 3 10 4.93 1.040
ACA
Misstated firms 25 100 59.36 27.012
Non-misstated firms 0 100 59.67 24.493
PMD
Misstated firms 0 100 .3515 .25560
Non-misstated firms 0 100 .3163 .26222
FS
Misstated firms 4.56 7.6 5.7992 .66846
Non-misstated firms 0 8.04 5.6174 .61805
FPROA
Misstated firms -22.95 23.55 4.3308 6.82143
Non-misstated firms -46.8 50.52 5.0643 8.21688
FL
Misstated firms 0 0.7088 .255279463 .1953190501
Non-misstated firms 0 3.2039 .198575086 .1678871695
RPT
Misstated firms 0 5.84 3.6951 1.48969
Non-misstated firms 0 7.96 3.6195 1.53214
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Following Table 6, it can be seen that between the misstated and 
non-misstated firms, there is not much different of the diversification in the 
Boardroom, the characteristics of the audit committee, the external audit 
attributes and between firms’ characteristics. Among the distinctive features 
of the misstated firms are that the misstated firms are more likely to have 
a higher ratio of directors with accounting and financial background, and 
misstated firms are more likely to have abnormal and longer audit report 
lag (representing the external audit effort). For dichotomous variables, the 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6 under Panel B. Similar with the 
findings in Panel A, there is not much different between the characteristics 
of the misstated firms and non-misstated firms. 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables (N: 39 misstatement and 3176 non-
misstatement observation)
Dichotomous 
Variables % of 1 % of 0
Mean 
Statistics
Std. Deviation 
Statistics  
PBD
Misstated firms .31 .468
Non-misstated firms .29 .453
PGV
Misstated firms .28 .456
Non-misstated firms .35 .478
Univariate Analysis
Table 7 reports the Pearson correlation of the variables are reported 
in Table 5.3. Referring to Table 5.3, the highest being the correlation 
between government ownership (PGV) and firm size (FS) at r=0.408. This 
is, however, being anticipated as a larger firm size are usually government-
linked companies with the majority shareholders being the government 
itself. Audit committee size (ACS) shows a negative and significant 
correlation with audit committee independence (ACI) with at r=-0.142, 
suggesting that as the audit committee size grows bigger, the members are 
less independent. Yet, the audit committee meeting (ACM) has a significant 
and positive correlation with audit committee independence (ACI) at 
r=0.052. This suggests that with more independent members on the audit 
committee, more discussions regarding accounting and financial reporting 
matters take place.
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In terms of political influence, audit committee size (ACS) has a 
negative correlation with politician on the board (PBD) at r= -0.063; and 
with the presence of government ownership in the firm (PGV) at r=-0.090. 
However, audit committee size (ACS) shows a positive and significant 
correlation with Bumiputera on Board (PMD) at r= 0.077.  On the other 
hand, audit committee independence (ACI) shows a negative and significant 
correlation with Bumiputera directors on Board (PMD) and the presence 
of government ownership in the firm (PGV) at r=-0.066 and at r=-0.066 
respectively. Audit committee meeting (ACM) also has a positive correlation 
with politician on the board (PBD) at r= 0.099; with Bumiputera on Board 
(PMD) at r= 0.234; and with the presence of government ownership in the 
firm (PGV) at r=0.092. While audit committee accounting expertise (ACA) 
shows a negative and significant correlation with politician on the board 
(PBD) at r= -0.095. The results suggest that both politician directors and 
Bumiputera directors which are independent may have seats in the audit 
committee and that having them in the committee would also result in a 
higher number of audit meetings.
Regarding with firms’ characteristics, audit committee size (ACS) has 
a negative correlation with firm size (FS) at r=-0.145; with firm profitability 
(FP) at r=-0.085; and with firm leverage (FL) at r=-0.035. Audit committee 
independence (ACI) and audit committee accounting expertise (ACA), on 
the other hand, have no significant correlations with all the variables of 
firms’ characteristics. Audit committee meeting (ACM) also has a positive 
correlation with firm size (FS) at r=0.228; and with firm leverage (FL) at 
r=0.096 but a negative correlation with firm profitability (FP) at r=-0.085. 
Even though there are several significant correlations in this study, it is still 
below the threshold value and lies within the medium range of correlations. 
Therefore, the findings does not indicate any major multicollinearity 
problem. Thus, none of the variables is excluded from the analysis.
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Table 7: Univariate Correlation Analysis between the Independent Variables
 ACS ACI ACM ACA PBD PMD PGV FS FPA FL RPT
ACS 1 -.142** -.024 -.013 -.063** .077** -.090** -.145** -.085** -.035* .028
ACI 1 .052** .001 .034 -.066** -.066** .018 -.030 .028 -.021
ACM 1 .021 .099** .234** .092** .228** -.085** .096** -.025
ACA 1 -.095** .031 -.006 .021 .018 -.004 -.022
PBD 1 .226** .149** .126** -.034 .043* .009
PMD 1 .216** .187** -.075** .089** .048**
PGV 1 .408** .088** .024 .033
FS 1 .155** .240** .082**
FPA 1 -.179** .033
FL 1 -.007
RPT           1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The Relationship among Corporate Governance, Political 
Influence, Earnings Management and Accounting 
Misstatement
In order to estimate the relationship among corporate governance, 
political influence, earnings management and accounting misstatement 
as well as to see whether earnings management intervene the relationship 
between predictors variables, multiple regression analysis and logistic 
regression analysis is applied. Baron and Kenny (1986) propose the 
following step in testing the intervention effect of variables on the outcome.
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Step One: Show that corporate governance and political influence 
correlated with accounting misstatement by regressed 
accounting misstatement on  corporate governance and 
political influence.
Step Two: Show that corporate governance and political influence 
correlated with earnings management by regressing 
accounting misstatement on  corporate governance and 
political influence.
Step Three: Show that earnings management affects accounting 
misstatement while controlling for corporate governance 
and political influence by regressing accounting 
misstatement on corporate governance, political influence 
and earnings management. It is not sufficient to regress 
earnings management with accounting misstatement 
because they both may be affected by corporate 
governance and political influence.
By controlling the effect of earnings management, the relationship 
between corporate governance, political influence and accounting 
misstatement get weak suggesting that the weakening effect has a direct 
relation with earnings management. Initially, Baron and Kenny (1986) 
suggested that step 1 should produce the significant effect and only then 
the later step can be carried out. However, Kenny (2014) contended that 
the process can be carried out even though the preceding step shows an 
insignificant result. According to Kenny (2014) and Kenny et al., (1998), 
the essential steps in establishing the intervention effect is just Step 2 and 
Step 3. The current study run logistic regression analysis to test for Step 1 
and Step 3, and multiple regression analysis to test for Step 2. The following 
section discusses the analyses undertaken.
Logistic Regression: Corporate Governance and Accounting 
Misstatements Step One
The analysis for examining the relationship between corporate 
governance, political influence and accounting misstatements employed 
in the following logistic regression model: 
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AMi,t = α0 + β1 ACSi,t + β2 ACi,t + β3 ACMi,t +β4 ACAi,t + β5 PBDi,t + β6 
PMDi,t + β7 PGVi,t + β8 FSi,t + β9 FPAi,t + β10 FLi,t + β11 RPTi,t + εi,t 
Table 8 presents both the logistic regression examining the 
effectiveness of audit committee in relation to accounting misstatement in 
model 1. Model 1 shows a value of model Chi2 of at 22.23 and is statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.0001) and also a lower McFadden’s pseudo R2 
of 0.0527. The model shows that audit committee independence (ACI) is 
positive and statistically significant with accounting misstatement at 10% 
level (z value = 1.45), whereas the other proxy for audit committee shows 
insignificant results. The significance and positive relationship between 
audit committee independence indicate that the higher the independence 
of the audit committee the higher will be the accounting misstatement. The 
reasons for the positive relationship might be due to multiple directorship 
of the member of the audit committee which reduce the suppose attention 
that the members need in monitoring the quality of the financial reporting 
(Emmanuel, Ayorinde and Babijide, 2014), hence support the notion that 
busyness of overstretched directors are not effective in monitoring the 
financial reporting quality. The results hence partially supporting H2. 
In terms of political influence, only government ownership shows a 
negative and significant relationship with accounting misstatement at 10% 
level, thus partially supporting the hypothesis predicted for H7b. This finding 
indicates that firms with substantial government shareholding are more 
likely to be acquitted with accounting misstatements. The current findings 
align with the notion made by Watts and Zimmerman (1990), that politicians 
and governments would avoid negative news or announcement such as 
accounting misstatement. For control variables, only firms’ size (FS) shows 
a positive and significant relationship with accounting misstatement at 1% 
level.  The findings indicate that firms with higher leverage coupled with a 
poor corporate governance are more likely to have a higher probability of 
accounting misstatements. 
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Table 8: Logistics Regression Examining the Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Accounting Misstatements in Malaysia
Variables 
Logistic Regression
Coefficient Sig.
ACS 0.013 0.96
ACI 0.019 1.45*
ACM 0.152 1.11
ACA -0.001 -0.14
PBD -0.064 -0.17
PMD 0.368 0.57
PGV -0.598 -1.48*
FS 0.562 1.86**
FPROA 0.005 0.16
FL 1.061 1.13
RPT 0.036 0.33
N 3215
McFadden’s pseudo R 0.0527
Model chi-square 22.23
Note. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level; **: Significant at the 0.05 level, *: Significant at the 0.10 level 
Multiple regression for Corporate Governance, Political 
Influence and Earnings Management – Step Two
The analysis for examining the relationship between audit committee, 
political influence and earnings management employed in the following 
regression model: 
EMi,t = α0 + β1 ACSi,t + β2 ACIi,t + β3 ACM + β4 ACAi,t + β6 PBDi,t + β7 
PMDi,t + β8 PGV + β9 FSi,t + β10 FPAi,t + β11 FLi,t + β12 RPTi,t + εi,t 
Table 9 below shows the results for the direct effect of audit committee 
and political influence on earnings management. Table 5.5 shows that the R2 
values for the three models of real earnings management are significant at 
1% level (0.222; p-value = 0.000 for the abnormal cash flow from operations 
(ABCFO); 0.086, p-value = 0.000 for the abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABDISEXP); and 0.198, p-value = 0.000 for the abnormal production costs 
(ABPROD) respectively).  
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Audit committee size (ACS) shows a positive and significant 
relationship with abnormal production costs (ABPROD) at 5% level 
(t=2.206) but is insignificant with both abnormal cash flow from operations 
(ABCFO) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP). The findings 
from the analysis suggest that the bigger the size of the audit committee, 
the higher will be the manipulation of abnormal production costs in the 
firms. Bigger audit committee size provides more opportunity for the firms 
to manipulate their productions costs. In addition, the results also show 
that audit committee size has a negative and significant relationship with 
accrual earnings management (PMM) at 5% level (t=1.797). This indicates 
that bigger audit committee size significantly reduces the practice of accrual 
earnings management in the firms. Collective and superior monitoring and 
control power in bigger audit committee size successfully enhance the 
financial reporting quality in the firms.
Meanwhile, audit committee independence (ACI) is statistically 
significant with abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCFO) and 
abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP) at 10% level (t=-1.162, 
t=-1.308) respectively. The negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and both cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses suggests that, if there is more independence directors sit in the audit 
committee, manipulation of cash flow from operations and discretionary 
expenses eventually will be less. This means that a higher percentage of audit 
committee independence improve the quality of financial reporting. This 
may be due to stringent monitoring by collective independence directors 
in the audit committee reduce the opportunity of earnings management in 
the firms (Davidson et al., 2005; Bedard et al., 2004). The independence of 
audit committee is necessary in monitoring the financial reporting process 
in order to enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
The results in Table 9 also shows that there is a significant and 
negative relationship at 10% level between audit committee meeting (ACM) 
with abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP, t=-2.304), abnormal 
production costs (ABPROD, t=-1.637) and accrual earnings management 
(PMM, t=-1.471). The frequency of audit committee meetings of three or 
more times per year exerts a significant positive impact on the financial 
reporting quality. In overall it can be said that frequent audit committee 
meeting reduces the practice of both real and accrual earnings management 
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in the firms. The findings from this study are consistent with the studies by 
Sun, Lan and Liu (2014), Garcia et al. (2010) and Xie et al. (2003).
The current findings also show that audit committee expertise (ACA) 
does not affect both real and accrual earnings management practice in the 
firms. It shows that, though Bursa Malaysia listing requirements and MCCG 
guidelines require the firms to appoint a member with financial expertise 
to sit in the audit committee in order to improve the good governance and 
financial reporting quality, the results fail to support the assumption. It can 
be concluded that audit committee’s audit expertise is not an important 
determinant in relation to real earnings management. The results hence 
partially support H1 which postulate that there is a significant relationship 
between audit committee and earnings management.
The findings from the study also find that politician on board 
(PBD) does not affect the real earnings management in the firms since 
the results show insignificant relationships between politician on board 
and all measurement for real earnings management. However, in terms 
of the relationship between politicians on board with accrual earnings 
management, there is a negative and significant relationship between both 
variables at 10% level (t=-1.570). The findings suggest that more politicians 
on board restrict and reduce the practice of accrual earnings management. 
The reasons might be due to the public image of politicians which require 
them to avoid any scandals thus necessitate them to pressure the management 
to improve the quality of their financial reporting. 
Meanwhile, Bumiputera directors on board (PMD), shows a negative 
and significant relationship with abnormal cash flow from operations 
(ABCFO) at 5% level (t-value=-1.910) and positive and is statistically 
significant with both abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP) at 
1% level (t-value=2.765). This means that more Bumiputera directors on 
board reduce the real earnings management in term of manipulation of 
cash flow from operations in the firms. Nevertheless, the political power 
of Bumiputera directors impaired the decision making of the board when 
it comes to discretionary expenses. 
Government ownership (PGV) on the other hand is negative and 
statistically significant at 10% level with abnormal discretionary expenses 
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(t-value=-1.307) and with abnormal production costs (t-value=-1.366) 
but have a positive and significant relationship with accrual earnings 
management (PMM) at 5% level (t=1.937). The current findings show that 
government ownership significantly reduces the practice of real earnings 
management which is consistent with the earlier study by Md Salleh 
(2009) and Eng and Mak (2003) which suggest that government ownership 
improve both good governance and financial reporting quality. However, the 
contradicting result for accrual earnings management can be justified due 
to the fact that accrual earnings management is less complex in term of the 
operationalization and due to the general assumption that there will be less 
scrutinization by the regulators when the government itself is the owner of 
the firm. The findings from the analysis partially support H4.
Table 9: Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis
ABCFO B t-Value sig. Value
(Constant) 0.078 2.183 0.029
ACS 0.000 0.193 0.847
ACI 0.000 -1.506* .132*
ACM 0.002 1.251* .211*
ACA 0.000 -0.278 0.781
PBD 0.002 0.477 0.633
PMD -0.011 -1.851** .064**
PGV -0.003 -0.907 0.365
FS 0.004 1.388* .165*
FPROA 0.005 21.474*** .000***
FPROE -0.011 -8.351*** .000***
FL -0.061 -6.381*** .000***
RPT -0.001 -0.776 0.438
R2 0.218
Adjusted R2 0.214
F-Statistic 55.812
ABDISEXP B t-Value sig. Value
(Constant) -0.785 -2.581 0.01
ACS -0.002 -1.521* .128*
ACI -0.001 -1.546* .122*
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ACM -0.033 -2.734*** .006***
ACA 0.000 -0.664 0.507
PBD -0.025 -0.91 0.363
PMD 0.155 3.120*** .002***
PGV -0.036 -1.266* .206*
FS 0.236 9.632*** .000***
FPROA 0.001 0.516 0.606
FPROE 0.009 0.801 0.423
FL 0.006 0.08 0.936
RPT 0.054 6.819 0
R2 0.078
Adjusted R2 0.073
F-Statistic 16.873
ABPROD B t-Value sig. Value
(Constant) -0.094 -1.98 0.048
ACS 0.000 1.683** .093**
ACI 0.000 0.042 0.966
ACM -0.004 -2.093** .036**
ACA 0.000 0.343 0.732
PBD -0.005 -1.11 0.267
PMD -0.002 -0.274 0.784
PGV -0.006 -1.339* .181*
FS 0.014 3.662*** .000***
FPROA -0.006 -19.905*** .000***
FPROE 0.006 3.587*** .000***
FL 0.051 4.018*** .000***
RPT 0 -0.187 0.852
R2 0.188
Adjusted R2 0.184
F-Statistic 46.279
PMM B t-Value sig. Value
(Constant) -0.267 -4.451 0
ACS 0.000 -1.797** .072**
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ACI 0.000 0.416 0.678
ACM -0.004 -1.471* .141*
ACA 0.000 -0.827 0.409
PBD -0.003 -0.485 0.628
PMD 0.017 1.721** .085**
PGV -0.006 -1.166 0.244
FS 0.041 8.509*** .000***
FPROA -0.001 -3.311*** .001***
FPROE 0.008 3.801*** .000***
FL -0.011 -0.659 0.51
RPT -0.001 -0.429 0.668
R2 0.042
Adjusted R2 0.037
F-Statistic 8.656
Logistic Regression: Corporate Governance, Political 
Influence and Earnings Management towards Accounting 
Misstatement- Step Three
The analysis for examining the relationship between corporate 
governance, political influence and earnings management employed in the 
following logistic regression model: 
AMi,t = α0 +β1 ACSi,t + β2 ACIi,t + β3 ACMi,t + β6 ACAi,t + β7 PBDi,t + 
β8 PMDi,t + β9 PGVi,t + β10 FSi,t + β11 FPAi,t + β12 FLi,t + β13 RPTi,t + β14 
ABCFOi,t + β15 ABDISEXPi,t + β16 ABPRODi,t + εi,t 
In Model 3, the relationship between audit committee, political 
influences, earnings management and accounting misstatement is 
examined. The overall results and the significance level of this model are 
composed of the combination of Model 1 and 2. The results show that 
after controlling the effect earnings management, the relationship between 
audit committee and political influences towards accounting misstatement 
is getting weaker signalling that the reasons for weakening might have a 
direct relation with earnings management. The findings in Model 3 shows 
insignificant relationship between the variables although the earlier model 
shows a significant relationship. This indicates that earnings management 
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is intervening the relationship between the variables. In other words, after 
controlling for earnings management, audit committee (audit committee 
size and audit committee meeting) and political influences (politician on 
board and Bumiputera on board) no longer affected the financial reporting 
quality of the firms. This may be because even though the firms have a 
diversified board and bigger audit committee still do not effectively detect 
the earnings management practices. 
On the other hand, since the effect of audit committee independence 
and government ownership remain significant even after controlling for 
earnings management, its means, besides earnings management there 
could be other variables which can intervene the relationship between audit 
committee, government ownership and accounting misstatement. 
Table 10: The Effectiveness of Audit Committee, Political Influence 
and Earnings Management towards Accounting Misstatements
Variables 
Logistic Regression
Coefficient Sig.
ABCFO 1.838 0.86
ABDISEXP -0.416 -1.3*
ABPROD 1.276 0.81
ACS 0.012 0.88
ACI 0.019 1.48*
ACM 0.142 1.03
ACA -0.002 -0.23
PBD -0.098 -0.26
PMD 0.457 0.7
PGV -0.593 -1.44*
FS 0.659 2.11**
FPROA 0.004 0.14
FL 1.053 1.15
RPT 0.052 0.47
N 3215
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.0597
Model chi-square 25.18
Note. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level; **: Significant at the 0.05 level, *: Significant at the 0.10 level
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Robustness Testing
It is important to note that the proportion of the accounting 
misstatement cases (i.e. the event) to the non-accounting misstatements 
observations in this study is quite low at 1.213% (39/3215). This imbalanced 
sample with a very wide gap for each group would be considered a rare 
event. Williams (2017) argues that a conventional logistic regression analysis 
may underestimate the probability of an event, P (Y=1), and overestimates 
coefficients of explanatory variables in the rare event situation. Thus as an 
alternative method to reduce the bias should be carried out. In analyzing rare 
event data, two methods seem outstanding among the others, namely the 
Firth logit (Firth, 1993) and the rare event logistic (King and Zeng, 2001). 
However, Williams (2017) suggests that the rare event logistics is somewhat 
overcorrecting bias in MLEs as n is getting small (<200).
Therefore, a Firth logit was employed as a robustness testing. Firth 
logit is a method where penalized likelihood is used to reduce small-sample 
bias in maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Penalized likelihood method 
also benefits from producing finite, and provides a consistent estimate of 
regression parameters even when the maximum likelihood estimate do not 
even exist because of complete or quasi-complete separation (Williams, 
2017). Heinz and Schemper (2002) suggest that Firth logit is a superior 
solution after comparing the Firth logit with ordinary MLE on small samples. 
Consistently, Allison (2012) also suggests the Firth logit in the case of 
penalized likelihood. The results of the Firth logit model are presented in 
Table 11.
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Table 11: Firth Logistics Regression on the Effectiveness 
of Audit Committee Towards Accounting Misstatements in Malaysia 
Firth Logistics Regression Examining the Effect of Corporate Governance 
on Accounting Misstatements in Malaysia
Variables Coefficient z-statistics
ACS 0.0136 1.04
ACI 0.0168 1.35*
ACM 0.0971 1.6
ACA -0.0003 -0.05
PBD 0.0517 0.96
PMD 0.3939 0.65
PGV -0.5826 -1.48*
FS 0.5979 2.25**
FP 0.0092 0.31
FL 1.1749 1.33*
RPT 0.0282 0.26
N 3215
McFadden’s pseudo R 0.025
Model chi-square 30.19
Number of clusters (firms) 643
Note. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level; **: Significant at the 0.05 level, *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Following Table 10, both models show a slight adjustments to the 
findings. Model 1 shows a model Chi2 of 39.94 and is statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.0001) with McFadden’s pseudo R2 of 0.0217. On the other 
hand, Model 2 shows a lower value of model Chi2 of 30.19 but is statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.0001) and also a slightly higher McFadden’s pseudo 
R2 of 0.025. Interestingly, as compared to the findings in the conventional 
logistic regression, several variables have become significant after being 
regress using Firth logit.
In model 1, board remuneration (BDREM) shows a positive and 
significant relationship with accounting misstatement at 10% level. 
Similarly, audit committee meeting (ACM) has a positive and significant 
relationship with accounting misstatement at 10% level.
In model 2, the table shows that the audit committee meeting (ACM) 
has a positive and significant relationship with accounting misstatement at 
10% level. While firms leverage (FL) also shows a positive and significant 
relationship with accounting misstatement at 10% level. In the conventional 
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logistic regression model (Table 5.4), these two variables are insignificant 
towards the announcement of accounting misstatement. 
CONCLUSION
Most firms within the research sample have shown compliance with the 
minimum requirements on the level of independent and financial knowledge 
of audit committee, as well as the meeting requirement, however, the findings 
are not as per expected. Audit committee as measured by audit committee 
independence is positively significant with accounting misstatements. 
This indicates that a higher percentage of independent auditor in the audit 
committee increase the occurrence of accounting misstatement in the firms. 
The situation can be related to busyness theory where independence directors 
are presumed to hold multiple directorships thus restrict them to properly 
monitor the firms making earlier detection of accounting misstatement is 
not possible (Emmanuel et al., 2014). The findings corroborate with the 
notion of forced compliance effect by the McMartin & Needles (2015). The 
finding of this study is consistent with the study by Sharma & Iselin (2012) 
whereby their study found a significant and positive relationship between 
the audit committee’s multiple-directorships and accounting misstatements 
post-SOX. 
The insignificant relationship between audit committee accounting 
expertise may relate to the findings of Abernathy et al., (2014). Their 
findings show that accounting expertise of audit committee members is less 
relevant towards financial reporting timeliness if the experience is gained 
from being a former CFO. Another possible explanation is the herding 
behaviour of the audit committee. Schöndube-Pirchegger & Schöndube 
(2011), offers an explanation of why the audit committee is ineffective within 
the corporate governance context. They introduced a model explaining the 
herding behaviour of the audit committee, in which the audit committee 
members are more inclined to submit to the auditor’s judgment and ignore 
their personal insights when it comes to decisions regarding accounting 
practices and financial reporting matters.
In contrast to the predictions regarding the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in maintaining higher financial reporting quality, the present 
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study finds minimal evidence that political factors influence the Boardroom 
towards accounting misstatements. Political influence is still relevant in 
a Malaysian business environment regarding financial reporting quality, 
however, the aggressiveness of the influence may have been diluted by 
the improvement of recent corporate governance reform. The monitoring 
characteristics of the board and audit committee coupled with the increased 
auditor quality may offset the aggressive political influence.
The findings of this study show that Malaysian firms prcatices earnings 
management. However, the aggressiveness of the earnings management 
is not being punished as evidenced by the low number of accounting 
misstatements (accounting restatements) that were being issued. However, 
there are still several issues regarding financial reporting quality and 
corporate governance that has not been covered by this study that could be 
relevant to the occurrence of earnings management, accounting misstatement 
and fraudulent financial reporting. Future studies may include AEM and 
REM for comparative purposes. A qualitative study may also provide in-
depth understanding from the behavioural perspective. 
The findings of the current study should be interpreted with caution 
as the study has several limitations. Firstly, the study only focuses on firms 
listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia, excluding financial institutions. 
Secondly, this paper was based heavily on content analysis. Thus, the data 
collected are self-verified as true. Thirdly, the research sample is only based 
on Malaysian firms, and therefore, the findings might not be applicable to 
other countries.
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APPENDIX A: MALAYSIAN CORPORATE SCANDALS
Facts of Case Sentence
A director of Kiara Emas Asia Industries Bhd (KEAIB), 
was charged with criminal breach of trust in relation to 
RM16,937,739.20 of the rights issue proceeds of KEAIB on 
three different occasions.
The accused was imposed a 
fine of RM200,000 for each 
charge (total RM 600,000). 
Two former independent directors of Transmile Group 
Berhad authorized the furnishing of misleading statements 
involving RM622 million for the financial years ended 2004 
to 2006.
The accused was sentenced 
to one year imprisonment and 
fined RM300,000 each. 
The former Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director 
of Welli Multi Corporation Berhad (WMCB), was charged for 
knowingly authorised the furnishing of misleading statement 
in WMCB’s Quarterly report for the financial period ended 30 
September 2006 to the Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.
The accused was sentenced 
to one day jail and a fine of 
RM400,000 each.
A former Group Managing Director of Polymate Holdings 
Berhad (PHB) and Managing Director of ABI Malaysia Sdn 
Bhd (its wholly owned subsidiary), was charged for knowingly 
authorising the furnishing of false statements Bursa, namely 
the inflated revenue and trade receivables of PHB for the 
year ended 30 September 2003, as contained in PHB’s 
2003 Annual Report.
The accused was f ined 
RM300,000, in default 1 year 
imprisonment. 
The former Financial Controller of Megan Media Holdings 
Berhad (MMHB), have abetted MMHB who had with intent 
to deceive, furnished false statements to Bursa Malaysia. 
The false statements were in relation to MMHB’s Revenue 
figures in its Financial statements for the year ended 30 April 
2006 and Quarterly Reports on Consolidated Results for the 
Financial Period ended 31 July 2006, 31 October 2006 and 
31 January 2007 respectively.
The accused was f ined 
RM350,000 (in default 1 year 
imprisonment).
Two former Directors of Mems Technology Berhad, was 
charged for knowingly authorised the furnishing of a 
misleading statement to Bursa Malaysia Berhad. The 
misleading statement is in relation to Mems Technology 
Berhad group’s revenue for year ended 31 July 2007 
contained in its condensed consolidated income statements 
for the 12 month period ended 31 July 2007.
The accused was charged on 
16 April 2009.
A former director of LFE Corporation Berhad was charged 
with nine charges including cheating and criminal breach of 
trust involving a total amount of RM24 million, and permitting 
the furnishing of misstated financial statements for all four 
quarters of year ended 31 December 2007.
The accused was sentenced 
to one year imprisonment and 
fined a total of RM1.2 million.
An executive director who was also a licensed fund manager 
of Metrowangsa Asset Management Sdn. Bhd. was charged 
for furnishing misleading financial statements by concealing 
funds received from two of its clients (Lembaga Tabung Haji 
and Mimos Berhad) in the amount of RM134 million (2000) 
and RM231 million (2001), respectively.
The accused was fined RM1 
million (RM500,000 for each 
charge)
